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THE EMERGING NATIONAL MILITARY STRATEGY
OF POWER PROJECTION AND THE ARMY'S CONTINGENCY CORPS

A thesis presented to the Faculty of the U.S. Army
Command and General Staff College in partial
fulfillment of the requirements for the
degree

MASTER OF MILITARY ART AND SCIENCE

by

HARRY E. MORNSTON, CPT(P), USA
B.S., United States Military Academy, 1980

Fort Leavenworth, Kansas

1991

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ABSTRACT

THE EMERGING NATIONAL MILITARY STRATEGY OF POWER PROJECTION AND THE ARMY'S CONTINGENCY CORPS, BY Captain(P) Harry E. Mornston, USA, 104 pages.

This thesis examines the force structure of the Army's contingency corps in light of the National Military Strategy that is emerging in the early 1990s. The environment that guided this nation's strategic thinking changed significantly in 1989-90. The military strategy that is evolving as a result of this change depends on the ability of our armed forces to project power to a number of regions throughout the world. The Army's contingency corps is a military organization designed to execute rapid deployment in support of a strategy that relies on power projection.

After reviewing the strategic background, this thesis applies the CGSC Methodology for Regional Force Planning to identify a feasible solution to determine the combat forces that are assigned to the contingency corps. The force structure issue is complicated by the need to rapidly project enough combat power from the United States to defeat sophisticated threat military forces that are equipped with lethal, modern weapon systems.

The study concludes that a mix of combat forces, each with its unique capabilities and limitations, is required. The mix of forces provides for a great deal of flexibility and allows for one force to complement another when properly employed. The proposed contingency corps force structure includes a light infantry division, an airborne division, an air assault division, a motorized regiment, and an armored cavalry regiment.

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CHAPTER 1

INTRODUCTION

"The United States is a global power with global interests. Threats to these interests arise from a variety of sources, include all levels of conflict and occur in all regions of the world."¹ The Army anticipates and responds to these threats by having combat-ready forces forward deployed in critical regions and by possessing the capability to react rapidly to regional contingencies anywhere in the world. In the words of the Army's Chief of Staff, General Carl E. Vuono, "The U.S. Army, like the nation's intercontinental nuclear force, is a strategic force. It has been irreplaceable in the past, and will be so in the challenging years ahead. For deterrence, ground forces - forward deployed or rapidly deployable - provide unique capabilities."² The Army's current force structure contains forces that are used to rapidly project power in crisis situations. This thesis will examine these contingency forces in the United States Army and provide a feasible answer to the question: What mix of combat forces maximizes the Army's capability to respond to a mid-intensity crisis situation?

The international environment has been evolving at an increased rate since the termination of World War II. This evolutionary process became almost revolutionary in late 1989 when the world witnessed huge changes in Europe that occurred spontaneously and almost simultaneously across the continent.

The emerging world situation will have a profound impact on the missions and structure of the military forces of the United States. In essence policy makers must rethink their strategies and then realign forces to keep up with the changing situation. But these new programs must be developed with caution because of the fragile nature of the world situation. As strategists respond to the new world environment they must not assume that the situation is exactly as it seems or that these encouraging trends cannot be reversed.

However, we must conclude that our post World War II policies, commitments and programs have been successful. Deterrence has prevented large scale war in Europe, the spread of Communism has been contained, and a degree of moderation has been introduced in parts of eastern Europe. The forward deployment of well trained, equipped, and led U.S. forces has been a significant portion of this strategy. The Warsaw Pact is dissolved, the Cold War is over, and the world is entering a new era.

While the threat from the Soviet Union seems to have diminished significantly, this is only one part of the

equation that must be considered in force planning. Granted, there is a reduced chance of large scale conventional war in Europe (and therefore less of a chance of nuclear confrontation escalating from that scenario). But the reduction of the Soviet threat does not equate to an "across-the-board" reduction of the security threats to the United States. To the contrary, it appears that the passing of the bipolar world has led to a destabilized world environment. The advent of the multipolar world has increased the number and type of threats that face the United States while simultaneously imposing limits on the use of force. More than ever before uncertainties obscure our perceptions of national security concerns. Likewise the point on the operational continuum from where threats will arise is also not clear. "It is probable that the evolving world will require more, not less, U.S. military presence and sometimes intervention."³ But it will become increasingly difficult to intervene as we reduce our forward deployed forces and witness the contraction of our global basing structure. The reduction of the military in the 1990s is a reality. The defense budget will be cut to allow growth in domestic programs and alleviate a portion of the budget problems.

As stated previously, the purpose of this thesis is to examine the force structure of the Army's contingency force. However it must be recognized that the force is the means of achieving the ends of defense policy. In other words there

must be a clearly articulated, coherent strategy that drives force planning. Without such a base to work from, all interests and all threats appear to be equal. Attempting to develop any type of force in this environment will be unfocused and will far outstrip the limited resources that are available.

The evolving National Military Strategy that will drive force structures is being developed with a great deal of meticulous study. The early forms of this new strategic outlook are the result of two studies conducted by the Pentagon. In spite of the fact that these two studies were conducted independently (one by the office of the Under Secretary of Defense for Policy and the other by the Joint Staff) using two different approaches, their conclusions were much the same.⁴

A rapidly increasing number of Third World countries now possess large, capable military forces that their leaders are not hesitant to commit in pursuit of their goals. Thus, the armed forces of the United States will be required to respond to a range of potential conflicts from peacetime competition to war. The regional conflicts that will flare up and threaten the interests of the United States will not be restricted to "low grade insurgencies" and other forms of low intensity conflict. Contingencies in the Third World will be diverse, unpredictable, and subject to rapid escalation. The 1991 war in the Persian Gulf is an example of what we may

encounter at the upper end of the spectrum. Though it appears that the worst case scenario of a short warning Warsaw Pact attack is no longer a possibility, the threats that continue to exist are, in many instances, able to field respectable conventional forces. We are witnessing an increasing degree of mechanization, sophistication, and modernization in the armed forces of the Third World. Under Secretary of Defense Wolfowitz warns that "potential adversaries in the Third World are no longer trivial military problems."⁵ After examining the weapons build-up around the world it appears that the term "low intensity conflict" is becoming a misnomer. The Central Intelligence Agency validates the increasing capabilities of our potential adversaries as follows:

At least twelve Third World armies possess more than 1000 tanks. Such nations as Iraq, Israel, Egypt, Saudi Arabia, and India have or are developing long-range missiles; according to the Central Intelligence Agency, some fifteen developing countries could be producing missiles with ranges of 3000 miles by the turn of the century. Chemical weapons were used in the Iran-Iraq war and are becoming the poor nations' mass destruction weapon of choice. Twenty or more countries are believed to have chemical weapons in hand or under development.⁶

There is serious concern within the intelligence community about Third World countries that already possess nuclear weapons and even more concern that other nations may soon obtain the technology and means to produce a nuclear arsenal.

Conventional forces are becoming increasingly important to counter these smaller regional threats. But US conventional

forces are being drawn down and portions of our forward deployed forces are being brought back to the United States. There is much speculation about the blueprint for the Army of the future. Currently it appears that the Army is moving toward a force structure that will be organized around four corps size elements. One corps will be forward deployed in the Atlantic theater with responsibilities in Europe and the Middle East. A second Army corps will provide a portion of the land forces in the Pacific theater. The third corps organization will have a reinforcing role. This corps will be comprised mostly of heavy units to back up the Atlantic force. And finally, and perhaps most importantly, the contingency corps. This force will be the rapid reaction, power projection force designed to respond to, in the words of General Colin Powell, "the unknown, the uncertain, the crisis that no one had predicted would happen, the contingency nobody had planned for."⁷ This Army force structure supports the strategic blueprint that is being considered for implementation by the Department of Defense and the Joint Staff that was discussed earlier. While the exact numbers and units are being worked out, it is safe to postulate that the Army will be much smaller, much more constrained by the budget, and much less of that Army will be based on foreign soil. The policy of "forward deployment" is evolving to a policy of forward presence. "Forward presence" is an all encompassing term which reflects a shift from a

primary emphasis on defending against a military threat with in-place military forces to a wide range of activities designed not only to defend, but also to further and protect U.S. interests.

The United States has an increasing need for a viable strategic force with sufficient combat power to accomplish a demanding global mission. The Continental United States (CONUS) based forces of the Army will be assigned power projection and reinforcing roles. In essence the United States will have a "strike force" as the military element of national power as opposed to a large deployed force to protect our interests. These contingency forces will be of great importance as unpredictability continues to be the constant in the world.

Contingency forces are not new to the U.S. Army. Rapid response to crises is an Army role that has endured throughout our history. It is in the immediate future however that these forces will become the military's primary tool. In effect we are staking our national interests on our ability to maintain peace or, if deterrence fails, win wars with a smaller force that is based thousands of miles from the site of potential conflict.

Contingency forces have been called upon by the National Command Authorities many times in the latter half of the 20th century. Some of the obvious examples are Lebanon in 1958, the Dominican Republic in 1965, Grenada in 1983, and Panama in

1989. The need to respond with military forces over great distances in order to protect vital national interests is not unique to the United States. In 1982 the United Kingdom responded militarily to a distant crisis in the Falkland Islands.

The contingency corps will be the Army's contribution to the joint force that responds to threats to our interests. Because of the volatile nature of crisis situations, this force will be required to react rapidly, move to any remote area of the globe, and accomplish any mission from a show of force to fighting a major conventional war. In other words this force must be able to go anywhere and do almost anything. Obviously, this force will require great versatility to respond to the diverse threats that exist. There is no doubt that a joint force that involves units from all of the services will be required. Likewise, the Army portion of that force will need to be a mix of units that offer a vast array of capabilities. The force will be tailored in accordance with each unique situation. This tailored force must be drawn from a previously identified, trained, ready body of units. The crisis will be challenging enough with a rapidly developing enemy situation, extended lines of communication, a hasty planning sequence done in the fog of great unknowns, and the difficulties of executing complex tasks in the joint arena. The Army component should be drawn from a standing team that is organized as and has the

principal mission of acting as the contingency force. Forming an ad hoc Army command that will be part of a Joint Task Force will only add more confusion and make the situation more difficult. This thesis will address the configuration of the Army organization that has the mission to train, deploy, and fight as a contingency force.

Purpose of the Thesis. The purpose of this thesis is to examine the structure of the Army's contingency force in light of the changing strategic situation and current world situation. Based on this analysis a recommendation for a future force structure will be offered.

Assumptions.

1. The U.S. military will continue to maintain contingency forces to provide a military response to crisis situations. The Army's portion of the force will be a corps sized element. It is unrealistic to believe that the Army can afford a larger force based on the number of other missions, the ever shrinking budget, and the current constraints of the system. Further it appears that and the Army Staff envisions the contingency force as a corps.

2. The structure of the Army's contingency force can be drawn from all CONUS based combat units.

3. Although the number of U.S. deployed forces is being reduced, the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO)

will remain the most significant military alliance of the United States.

4. Defense spending as a portion of the Gross National Product will continue a downward trend.

5. The militarization of developing countries will continue and in some cases will continue to be viewed as potential threats.

Delimitations.

1. The study will not use classified material.

2. Research will not include computer driven Operations Research/Systems Analysis methods or war games.

3. The study will consider only conventional, active Army forces. Special Operating Forces and the Reserve Components will not be addressed. Special Operating Forces in a contingency force role is beyond the scope of this study. Combat forces from the Reserve components that require mobilization are not appropriate in a rapid response scenario because of the time restraints normally associated with contingency operations.

4. The competing role of contingency forces in the Air Force, Navy, and Marine Corps will not be addressed. The "jointness" of the U.S. contingency force is not in doubt. The Army will provide forces to a Commander in Chief (CINC) of a unified command who will deploy and command the joint

force in accordance with his analysis of the situation. During a contingency operation the interaction with sister services will begin at the very outset and continue throughout the mission. Interoperability and cooperation will be absolutely essential during the deployment phase and when conducting tactical operations. The capabilities of the sister services, in conjunction with the Army's contribution to the contingency force, provide military power that is an incredibly powerful tool.

The U.S. Marine Corps is exceptionally well suited as an expeditionary force. The forces afloat, prepositioned equipment, and capability to conduct forced entry by amphibious assault support many of the glowing assessments offered by the Commandant of the Marine Corps.⁸ Like every other force, however, the Marine Corps can not stand alone as the ground combat component in the contingency force. Even the U.S. Marines have their limitations.

This thesis will not address the capabilities of the U.S. Marine Corps in their expeditionary role. The Army portion of the force will be designed considering that the other services will be part of the larger picture and recognizing that extreme redundancy in the force must be avoided.

5. This thesis will address in detail only combat forces. Sustainment will be briefly discussed in reference to the model that is applied but the combat service support force

structure will not be addressed. This thesis also does not address the combat support (CS) elements that are absolutely critical to the contingency corps. The combat multipliers provided by forces such as military intelligence units, combat engineers, psychological operations, military police and a multitude of other units with unique capabilities make the contingency corps a viable unit. It is not an exaggeration to speculate that any operation would be at risk without the presence of the appropriate combat support elements.

Significance of the Study. The structure of the Army's contingency force warrants investigation in light of the evolving world situation, new strategy and ongoing reduction of the Army. As the United States reduces the number of deployed forces, and simultaneously faces increasing threats around the world, the importance of the contingency force is magnified.

Endnotes

¹U.S. Army, The United States Army Posture Statement FY 90/91, HQDA, Washington, DC, 1990,1.

²U.S. Army, Focus, HQDA, Washington, DC, June 1989,6.

³Henry C. Bartlett, "Global War Games and the Real World," Naval Institute Proceedings (February 1991): 27.

⁴John D. Morrocco, New Pentagon Strategy Shifts Focus from Europe to Regional Conflicts," Aviation Week and Space Technology 133 (13 August 1990): 25.

⁵George B. Crist, "A U.S. Strategy for a Changing World," Strategic Review 18 (Winter 1990): 19.

Endnotes

⁶Ibid., 21.

⁷From remarks delivered by General Colin Powell at the 72d Annual Convention of the American Legion, Indianapolis, Indiana, 30 August 1990.

⁸Alfred M. Gray, "Planning for the Future: A Policy of Stability," Strategic Review 19 (Winter 1991): 11.

CHAPTER 2

REVIEW OF LITERATURE

This chapter identifies and analyzes the material consulted in preparing this thesis. By examining and synthesizing existing literature, and applying it to the variables of this particular study, a reasonable answer to the research question will be determined.

The sources used to prepare this study fit into three categories. (1) U.S. Army doctrinal publications that apply to contingency operations. (2) Publications that discuss the emerging National Military Strategy and (3) articles and publications that are related to force structures, options for building a rapidly deployable force, recommendations for new weapon systems or new outlooks on using existing systems or units in a contingency force role.

Doctrinal Publications

Field Manual 100-5, Operations is the U.S. Army's keystone doctrinal manual on war fighting. This manual was published in 1982, revised in 1986 and is the basis for AirLand Battle

doctrine. Although this publication is primarily concerned with how to conduct conventional battles at the tactical and operational levels it does briefly address contingency operations in Chapter 12.

In FM 100-5 contingency operations are defined as "military operations requiring rapid deployment to perform military tasks in support of national policy."¹ FM 100-5 further characterizes contingency operations as directed by the National Command Authorities, always joint undertakings, conducted within the framework of the Unified Command System, and employed in various areas of operation depending on the situation. According to the doctrine in FM 100-5 the Joint Chiefs and unified and specified commanders consider nine factors involving force readiness, availability, and appropriateness in their plans. These factors relate primarily to the nature and type of force that can be used in contingency operations. More specifically FM 100-5 identifies and describes seven of the nine considerations. They are: mission, adequacy, deployability, supportability, affordability, availability of forces, and use of indigenous forces. (The manual fails to mention the other two factors.) In the description of availability of forces it is stated that "light forces, when adequate to the threat are the preferred army force."² The ambiguous qualifier "when adequate to the threat" is of great importance in this era of increasingly capable threat forces. Light forces lack the

firepower, mobility, and protection of heavy forces. "Heavy forces take longer to deploy and are more difficult to support, but may be necessary to defeat the enemy."³ FM 100-5 also briefly addresses, command and control, strategic deployability, and employment. In the section on employment the point is made that heavy forces (mechanized, armor, and aviation) may be needed to gain a mobility advantage over the enemy.

The discussion of contingency operations in a scant four pages of our most important doctrinal manual illustrates the relative insignificance attached to this type of action in 1986 when the manual was published. The Army was still fixated on what was considered to be the impending battle in Europe. Draft versions of AirLand Battle-Future are much more focused on contingency operations.

Because FM 100-5 "furnishes the authoritative foundation for subordinate doctrine [and] force design..." many doctrinal manuals contain a chapter on contingency operations that mimics the verbiage in FM 100-5. For instance FM 1-100, Doctrinal Principles for Army Aviation in Combat Operations, addresses contingency operations in the same manner as FM 100-5.

The Strike Operations Handbook for Commanders was published in March 1990 by the Center for Army Tactics at Fort Leavenworth. This is a "nuts and bolts" publication that fits the description of a how-to-fight manual. The first chapter

is an introduction to contingency operations. The remainder of the manual discusses the forces and type of tactical operations that are common to contingencies. Special emphasis is given to operations involving both heavy and light forces. This manual was produced to fill the void of doctrinal publications for contingency operations at the tactical level.

National Military Strategy

There are a variety of sources that address the modifications to the National Military Strategy that policymakers are struggling with as a result of changes in the strategic and domestic environments. The post-Cold War era has been referred to as the New World Order by President George Bush. The events that have caused the perception that a profound change has occurred in the strategic environment are primarily the collapse of the Warsaw Pact and other sweeping changes in eastern Europe and the Soviet Union. These vast changes have caused the military to reevaluate and revamp its strategy.

The fact that the forward deployed strategy had achieved its goal (or was on the verge of success) and therefore needed to be examined was first recognized in the summer of 1989 (three months before the first obvious signs of massive change) by Admiral William Crowe when he was serving as the

Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff.⁴ Since that time a number of official and unofficial sources have addressed the subject. Some of the sources that address the changes to strategy also recognize that the force structure will also be affected.

Among the most authoritative public sources that address the evolving National Military Strategy are speeches or remarks presented by key defense officials. On 30 August 1990 General Colin Powell addressed the Annual Convention of the American Legion in Indianapolis, Indiana. In his remarks General Powell discussed the military strategy that will be required to continue to protect U.S. interests in the near future. General Powell referred to contingency operations as an enduring reality of strategy that require "the best trained, most ready GIs we have -- forces that are light, mobile, ready to go at a moment's notice..."⁵

Lieutenant General George Butler, Chief of Plans and Policy, the Joint Staff, provided additional detail concerning the emerging strategy (and resulting force structure) in a speech entitled "New Directions in American Military Strategy." These remarks given at the Center for Defense Journalism definitively outline a move toward a power projection strategy. A significant issue from this speech is that General Powell envisions a contingency force that does not contain heavy forces. LTG Butler reports "The contingency force would comprise Army light and airborne divisions... The

contingency force is the tip of the spear, first into action, and followed as required by heavier forces and longer term sustainment."⁶

General George Crist (USMC-retired) former Commander in Chief of the U.S. Central Command, addressed the transitions that are occurring in the Winter 1990 issue of Strategic Review. His article entitled, "A U.S. Military Strategy for a Changing World" discusses in great detail the need for a strategy of power projection in light of international and domestic pressures. General Crist further addresses the forces required to implement a power projection strategy and concludes that a mix of heavy and light conventional forces comprised of Army, Navy, Marine Corps, and Air Force elements is required.

Also in Strategic Review (Spring 1990) Mackubin Thomas Owens discusses the relationship between "geo-political reality," grand strategy, military strategy, and force structures. Owen's article, "Force Planning in an Era of Uncertainty" argues against drastically reducing the defense budget. Owen claims that the geo-political reality and goals of the United States' grand strategy remain constant, but that changes in the security environment mean that the United States can cautiously modify its military strategy. Owen's view of strategy is that deterrence will remain the goal but its form will change. Forward deployment of U.S. forces will be significantly reduced and power projection will increase in

proportion to the decline of forward deployment.⁷ As Owen shifts his discussion to designing the forces to support this strategy he asserts that Light Infantry Divisions offer few of the required capabilities. Owen explains

Contrary to what some commentators envision, the Army in particular should not be shifting to a lighter force structure. For instance the Light Infantry Division (LID) has only limited tactical mobility, fire power, and sustainability. While such units are useful in very limited contingencies, e.g. Panama, where a significant basing infrastructure already existed, their marginal utility diminishes as the technological sophistication of potential adversaries increases and as access to bases goes down.

Within the Army Staff strategic and force development issues are the responsibility of the Deputy Chief of Staff for Operations and Plans (DCSOPS). A principal assistant to the DCSOPS is Brigadier General Daniel Christman, currently serving as the Director of Strategy, Plans and Policy. General Christman has authored several articles and given speeches that further develop the idea of this new strategy and provide insight into the Army's plans for supporting the war-fighting CINCs who will execute the policies of the strategy. In addressing the evolution of a new National Military Strategy General Christman calls force projection the hallmark of the new strategy and contingency operations a form of power projection. General Christman cites the validation of new strategic concepts during Operation Desert Storm. He states, "The requirement for a contingency force that can be

tailored with light, heavy, and SOF is not new -- but the emphasis and focus are."⁹ Christman also mentions that in recent years contingency operations have been increasing in frequency.

For the purpose of this thesis there are adequate sources that address the emerging strategic concepts that will drive our force structures of the future. The National Military Strategy will be based on forward presence coupled with an ability to project power around the globe to counter threats of any nature. Although there is general agreement about the preeminent position of contingency forces as the means to accomplish this strategy, it is already becoming apparent that there is not universal concurrence on how to structure the Army's contingency corps.

Force Alternatives

The forces that are included in the contingency corps are of tremendous importance because of the demanding, diverse tasks that will be assigned to this organization. The contingency corps, in concert with forces from sister services, will provide the military response to crisis situations when the National Command Authorities determine that other elements of national power are not appropriate. It is probable that the contingency force will be called on to react to many diverse and difficult situations. Therefore

this force will be required to possess many capabilities that can be generated only by combining different types of units. The idea of combining different types of forces into the organization charged with being the nation's response force is not new. Both the United States and the French now structure their contingency forces in this manner.¹⁰

Many authors have addressed the capabilities of various Army units and the suitability of these units for a variety of missions. Some of the sources are focused on rapid deployability and other issues that are of great importance to the planners of the contingency corps. Other articles were written for different purposes but their ideas are germane and can be applied to this study.

It is not surprising that many of these articles are written with a noticeable touch of parochialism. Organizations will attempt to justify their existence by becoming an integral component of the nation's military strategy. For Army units this means rapid deployment, flexibility, combat power (lethality), and other specific peculiarities that apply to contingency forces. The literature that addresses the options for designing and building a contingency corps is immense and diverse. There are many ideas on the subject.

Before we survey the multitude of recommendations and ideas concerning specific forces that can contribute to the contingency corps it is important to identify a fundamental

rift that has existed between two factions in the Army for years. This disagreement between heavy units that maintain peace through their deterrent effect in Europe and the expeditionary troopers in the strategic reserve will be fueled by the imminent changes in strategies, priorities, and end strength. This disagreement is vividly demonstrated in two articles published in Parameters in the fall of 1989 and the fall of 1990.

The first of these two articles created a great deal of controversy when Dan Bolger described the "Two Armies" that he sees existing at odds with each other within the U.S. Army. Bolger heralds the expeditionary army as the real warriors in that remain prepared to protect the interests of the United States. Bolger castigates the heavy, forward deployed units that are in a prolonged stand off in Europe (and to a lesser extent in Korea) as a "show army." The implication is that these units serve their purpose not because of their high degree of readiness and constant vigilance but because of their mere presence. Bolger even claims that "display units are not focused on imminent combat."¹¹ Bolger's concern is that the expeditionary army is not recognized for the absolutely critical role it plays in our defense. He sees the funds, new equipment, doctrinal development, and other assets being focused on the large, but dormant, display units that will probably never see a shot fired in anger. The expeditionary army will continue to answer the call to protect

American interests around the globe. It is these units that can claim "when we were needed we were there."

The antithesis to Bolger's article is entitled "Whence the Big Battalions?" In this article Fred Chiaventone makes a case for a calm, thorough evaluation of the threat before the United States abandons the "big battalions" that have been the tools of peace for forty five years. Chiaventone sees the rush toward a "teeth-and-claws" expeditionary army that is politically and economically appealing as a risky proposition. He advocates taking a lesson from history that tells us that all future wars may not be short term, low-intensity scenarios where fast and violent execution will inevitably preclude a need for long-term sustainment.¹²

Chiaventone tells us that the changes in the Eastern bloc may be transitory and that war in Europe is not impossible. The possibility that our estimate of future wars is inaccurate (as have been almost all of the predictions throughout history) justifies the need for heavy forces in the Army of the future.

Because of their lack of heavy equipment (such as large vehicles) and austere support structure, light forces in the Army are the most deployable in a short period of time. Light units can be deployed using the smallest amount of strategic airlift assets. "Light" forces currently in the Army force structure include four Light Infantry Divisions (LID), the 82d Airborne Division, and the 101st Airborne Division (Air Assault). There is one school of thought that supports

organizing the contingency corps with only these types of light units. Certainly the strategic mobility of light infantry divisions is an appealing trait. The proponents of the LIDs strongly believe that light fighters are the answer to our power projection needs. As previously mentioned, General Colin Powell has stated that he favors building the contingency force with light units from the Army, complemented by units from the United States Marine Corps, and reinforced by heavy divisions at a later date.

In 1982 Colonel Peter Boylan described the supreme utility of light forces, particularly airborne units, in an article entitled "Power Projection, Risk, and the Light Force." Boylan asserts that the rapid deployment and forced entry capabilities of airborne units are tremendous assets in a contingency operation. He believes that these attributes may outweigh the paucity of fire power, tactical mobility, and protection that characterize airborne units. Boylan's premise is that a force deployed to the location of impending hostilities at an early stage of the situation may defuse the situation and preclude the crisis from developing further.¹³ In effect Boylan is advocating a preemptive use of power projection by light forces so heavier follow-on forces may not be needed at all.

"Middleweight Forces and the Army's Deployability Dilemma" was written by Peter Herrly and published in Parameters in September 1989. In this article Herrly describes "desirable

features" for future general purpose forces that include strategic deployability, high lethality, tactical and operational mobility, survivability, versatility, and sustainability. Herrly offers motorized infantry as a unit that possesses these features. It is interesting to note that according to Herrly's description, survivability can be achieved by protection (i.e. armor), mobility, command and control, or a combination of these attributes.¹⁴

Survivability is the most critical issue for a middleweight unit. Herrly alleges that rapid mobility, clever tactics, and sophisticated C3I can overcome a lack of armored protection. The 9th Infantry Division has undergone many transformations in the last decade. For varying periods of time this unit has been "straight leg," a High Technology Light Division, and most recently motorized. It is a middleweight force that is built around high mobility multi-purpose wheeled vehicle (HMMWV) variants and employs the tube launched, optically tracked, wire guided (TOW) weapon system as its primary tank killer. Herrly recognizes the potential of using middleweight units in contingency operations because these units attempt to bridge the gap between light units that may lack sufficient combat power and heavy units that are too ponderous to get to the battlefield in time. Unfortunately, the 9th Infantry Division is among the forces scheduled for eradication as the Army down sizes. One brigade or regiment of this division will probably remain on the force list.

In spite of the fact that they have resisted developing anything other than a main battle tank for years, the armor community leads the proponents for including heavy forces in the contingency corps. The strategy of forward deploying and prepositioning heavy divisions in Europe did not demand armored vehicles that were rapidly deployable. The decline of the Soviet threat and the advent of a power projection strategy has caused the "combat arm of decision" to fight for its life. Light tanks, armored gun systems, and most importantly a changed mentality about the use of force dominate the agenda at Fort Knox. The effort to field a light armored unit is now underway with a great sense of urgency. In addition to attempting to develop new weapons, there are a number of initiatives for providing the fire power, mobility, and protection (together these elements produce shock action) that are necessary for a combat force to succeed against a reasonably capable adversary.

"A New Day for Armor or the Last Glimmer of Sunset?" written by Thomas Bruno and published in Armor magazine calls for the creation of a light armored force and a light armored cavalry regiment. Bruno recognizes that armored vehicles that are light enough to be deployed by air will not have the armor protection of a main battle tank.¹⁵ However, a lightly armored vehicle provides a higher degree of protection from small arms fire and artillery shrapnel than wheeled vehicles such as HMMWVs. In order to achieve the additional combat

power that will allow the contingency force a reasonable chance for success in a mid-intensity conflict, some type of armored unit that possesses significant tank killing ability is required.

A.J. Bacevich offers the present armored cavalry regiment (ACR) as alternative to provide the "heavy punch." The combat vehicles organic to the ACR include the M1 tank and the cavalry version of the Bradley Fighting Vehicle. These are the two most capable armored vehicles in our Army and perhaps of any army in the world. They are also the heaviest. Bacevich argues that by carefully tailoring the subordinate elements of the ACR to the situation and by capitalizing on the capabilities of the Bradley Fighting Vehicle (which is slightly more deployable than the M1), a deployable package (with some semblance of unit integrity) of the most lethal weapon systems available can be rapidly projected.¹⁶ In addition, the ACR is especially well suited to execute the tactical missions that are likely to be required of a heavy unit during contingency operations.

Another alternative for providing enhanced fire power, mobility, and protection, without sacrificing deployability and economic feasibility is suggested by Tom Rozman. Rozman's proposal for "Making Light Forces More Flexible and Responsive" is a system of augmentation with light armored vehicles (LAVs). Again the reality of the need to quickly project power to face an array of increasingly sophisticated

enemies drives the author to conclude that the light forces of the U.S. Army lack the combat power to survive. Rozman suggests that a fleet of LAVs that is available to augment light infantry when required by the tactical situation can bolster the capabilities of the light force.¹⁷ LAVs are a family of wheeled vehicles that can be fitted with a variety of weapons and that range in weight from nine to fifteen tons. These vehicles are currently used extensively by the U.S. Marine Corps and offer an alternative that merits consideration because of cost factors (a wheeled vehicle is less expensive to procure and maintain than a tracked vehicle), availability (LAVs are already through the deliberate, drawn-out, development process and could be fielded in a shorter period of time than systems that are still on the drawing board), and interoperability with the Marines. In effect Rozman sees the LAV as a battlefield taxi for light forces. The light force would maintain its orientation and continue to emphasize operations in broken terrain and built-up areas, but would have the luxury of increased mobility when needed.

Not everyone in the armor community is willing to hastily abandon the light tank that has been in the Army for decades. The M551 Sheridan does not enjoy widespread acclaim as a fighting vehicle but Harold Beverage, writing from his perspective at the user level recognizes the utility of this old work horse. In his article "Armor Support in the Low- to

Mid-Intensity Conflict" Beverage quickly deduces that a light force projected onto a battlefield to oppose a foe that fields any type of credible armor threat is likely to meet with disaster. According to Beverage "The combined arms force will be the key to successful missions in the future as in the past. Our assault troops must have armor support in the initial stage of conflict."¹⁸ Beverage also notes the need for a tank killing asset other than wire guided missiles. The current generation of medium and heavy anti tank missiles have limited utility in areas of dense vegetation and urban environments. The Sheridan appeals to Beverage because of its strategic mobility (10 C5 sorties delivers 40 Sheridans and 730 personnel), its ability to be delivered by air drop, the fire power of the 152mm main gun, and the fact that the Sheridan is present for duty and a proven war horse. Beverage sees an enhanced role for the Sheridan while the Armored Gun System meanders through the procurement process.

The literature that addresses the potential forces that are available for employment in contingency operations exposes the capabilities and limitations of many Army units. Several convincing arguments are presented concerning the type of units, equipment, personnel, training, and organizations that are required of a contingency force. In order to determine the optimal force structure, the alternatives must be considered using a methodical process and evaluated against specific criteria.

Endnotes

¹U.S. Army, FM 100-5, Operations (Washington: Department of the Army, 1986), 169.

²Ibid., 170.

³Ibid.

⁴Daniel W. Christman, "Desert Shield/Storm: A Case Study of the Emerging National Military Strategy," Remarks delivered at the Triangle University Security Seminar, Durham, North Carolina, 4 April 1991.

⁵Colin L. Powell, Intuited remarks presented at the 72d Annual Convention of the American Legion, Indianapolis, Indiana, 30 August 1990.

⁶George L. Butler, "New Directions in American Military Strategy," Remarks presented at the National Press Club, Boston, Massachusetts, 27 September 1990.

⁷Mackubin Thomas Owens, "Force Planning in an Age of Uncertainty," Strategic Review 18 (Spring 1990): 18.

⁸Ibid., 19.

⁹Daniel W. Christman, "A Case Study of the Emerging National Military Strategy."

¹⁰Gerard Turbe, "France's Rapid Deployment Forces," International Defense Review 20 (August 1987): 1023.

¹¹Daniel P. Bolger, "Two Armies," Parameters 19 (September 1989): 32.

¹²F.J. Chiaventone, "Whence the Big Battalions?" Parameters 20 (September 1990): 37.

¹³Peter J. Boylan, "Power Projection, Risk, and the Light Force," Military Review 62 (May 1982): 65.

¹⁴Peter F. Herrly, "Middleweight Forces and the Army's Deployability Dilemma," Parameters 19 (September 1989): 48.

¹⁵Thomas A. Bruno and John T. Broom, "A New Day for Armor or the Last Glimmer of Sunset?" Armor 99 (January-February 1990): 9.

Endnotes

¹⁶A.J. Bacevich, "Deployable Armor Today," Military Review 67 (April 1987): 16.

¹⁷Tom Rozman, "Making Light Forces More Flexible and Responsive," Armor 100 (January-February 1991): 19.

¹⁸Harold G. Beverage, "Armor Support in Low- to Mid-Intensity Conflict," Armor 99 (September-October 1990): 16.

CHAPTER 3

METHODOLOGY

This thesis will examine the Army's contingency corps and determine the proper mix of combat forces for this unit. The study will not address specific TO&Es or other details that are usually addressed by force developers using very complex tools such as computers and wargames. The output will be on a relatively macro level. The product will identify the mix of units by type, capability and numbers of divisions.

The first step in the force design process is to establish the need for a particular force by examining the strategic environment. This involves a review and assessment of national interests and objectives. As discussed in Chapter 1, the national strategy, particularly the National Military Strategy is the source of guidance and the base from which a force is designed. Thus this study begins with a brief assessment of the global environment and the interests of the United States followed immediately by an examination by the military strategy that will drive the force structure.

Of great importance in establishing the need for a force is an assessment of the threat that may challenge our

interests. When dealing with contingency operations that are conducted in support of national policy, in any region of the world, against any foe, it is particularly difficult to address the threat. The threat is vague, undefined, and can appear with little or no warning. In the current world that is searching for stability in the aftermath of the decline of Soviet power, the threat is even more difficult to template.

But we cannot be content in describing the threat as "unpredictable" and leave it at that. Potential threats must be analyzed at all levels (strategic, operational, and tactical). Edward Luttwak warns "If we abstain from prediction, proclaiming instead the only certainty is uncertainty, we are left no alternative but to continue upholding the grand coalition."¹ This study will examine the threat at a mid level-- below the web of world politics, but above the level of counting tanks, fighter aircraft, and infantry divisions. A close examination of the trends in the development of military forces and capabilities of regional players is suitable for this study.

After reviewing the relationship between the new world order and United States' interests and the threat to those interests, it will become apparent that our contingency force will need to be built in accordance with specified capabilities. In effect we are writing the specifications for the force.

One of the most pressing issues for the contingency force is the nature of the combat environment in which it has potential to be deployed. A method to address this issue is to attempt to identify the point or range on the operational continuum in which the contingency force must function. The operational continuum is a scale that attempts to characterize the totality or intensity of warfare. The notion and application of this scale will be discussed briefly in this study.

The next step in this study will be to apply the Command and General Staff College (CGSC) Methodology for Regional Force Planning (MFRFP). This model (shown at enclosure 1) is an analytic tool used to collect and process information. It is particularly useful at the operational level of war. Specifically the methodology is used to analyze forces, terrain, and command and control organizations to recognize force requirements. This methodology is clearly the link between national objectives or goals and operational force planning.

Paragraph 2 of the methodology is the Development of Regional Military Requirements. This step is undertaken only after an analysis of the background (interests, enemy forces, geography, etc) is completed. In application, Paragraph 2 of the model is a matrix consisting of time/sequence criteria (employment, sustainment, deployment, training, mobilization) on one axis and functional areas (equipment, personnel,

doctrine, and organization) on the other axis. All elements of the matrix will be addressed, but the greatest effort will focus on the employment, deployment, and training phases of the organization.

The MFRFP is ideally suited for the level of detail that this thesis is examining. The shortfall usually associated with the MFRFP is in attempting to apply it to determine precise force structures and organizations. The model is designed to provide a point of departure or a starting point for developing a force. It is clearly not intended for an in depth "micro application" in any scenario. The limitations of the methodology will not have an adverse impact on this study.

Paragraph 2 of the model translates the specifications that were derived out of the background analysis into tangible military units and capabilities. For this study the model will be applied to a force that is designed to operate in a contingency environment. This application will include the technical/tactical discussions of forced entry capabilities, strategic mobility, fire power, protection, tactical mobility, visibility, and risk. Obviously there will be trade-offs and compromises. It is at this point that the hard decisions will be made concerning which forces are included and which are not.

But it is not as easy as simply applying a model. Paragraph 2 of the methodology will produce a best case, or model contingency corps. This version will be based purely on an operational assessment unrestrained by current force structures, the budget, or competing priorities. In effect it is a wish list. It is reasonable to expect that this vision of the contingency corps will require some scaling back to become realistic. However based on its relative importance in the future security environment as previously discussed the limitations that are imposed should be minor.

When applying the MFRFP in its purest form the next step is to compare the requirements with current capabilities. For the purposes of this study the comparison step will be omitted and replaced by an analysis of the realities of the situation. After restricting the best case force structure by examining the expected limitations the end result will be a proposal for a viable, realistic contingency corps.

Endnotes

¹Edward N. Luttwak, "The Shape of Things to Come," Commentary 89 (June 1990): 17.

CGSC methodology for regional force planning

I. REGIONAL ANALYSIS IN TERMS OF:

A. MISSION

B. FORCES

C. AREA

D. COMMAND AND CONTROL

II. DEVELOPMENT OF REGIONAL MILITARY REQUIREMENTS

EQUIPMENT PERSONNEL DOCTRINE ORGANIZATION

A. EMPLOYMENT

B. SUSTAINMENT

C. DEPLOYMENT

D. TRAINING

E. MOBILIZATION

III. REGIONAL FORCE DEVELOPMENT PLANNING

A. REGIONAL REQUIREMENTS

B. CURRENT CAPABILITIES

C. IDENTIFIED DEFICIENCIES

D. CORRECTIVE PROGRAMS

E. RISK

ENCLOSURE 1

CHAPTER 4

ANALYSIS

"Our strategy must be designed for the long term, to guide force development, weapons procurement, and arms negotiations."¹ All military missions flow from strategy; therefore, to understand the forces that exist to execute the strategy it is essential that the strategic concept be understood. It has become fashionable to call for a drastically reduced military force in light of the decline of the Soviet Union; however, there is considerable risk in structuring the U.S. military posture and realigning world wide commitments without reference to an overall strategic plan.

The essence of strategy is the coordination of ends, ways and means. The ends or national interests of our strategy are elucidated by the President in his National Security Strategy of the United States. These interests are virtually unchanging--the survival of the United States, a healthy growing economy, a stable and secure world, and healthy alliance relationships. The requirement for and application of the means are prone to change. The ways of strategy

(strategic concepts) are implemented as policies, programs, and commitments. The ways shift and are modified over time to reflect internal and external pressures in the environment. When the ways are modified to continue to protect our national interests there will usually be a corresponding change in the means. To the military strategist the means are the organizations, equipment, and personnel of the armed forces. These forces will change dramatically as a result of the transformation of the international order that occurred in late 1989 and the early 1990s.² The armed forces of the United States are currently undergoing a massive reduction and realignment as a result of ongoing transformations in the internal and external environments.

In 1989, revolution swept through eastern Europe and when it did the strategic principles of Cold War era documents such as NSC 68 became obsolete. The world changed in 1990 as the Soviet Union passed from the scene as a world super power. There is no doubt that the Soviets remain a military super power. Their armed forces still possess immense capabilities; but it is almost universally accepted that our greatest competitor since 1945 has collapsed in exhaustion and is near total ruin. The Soviet-led Warsaw Pact is defunct as a military coalition, overt symbols of repression such as the Berlin wall no longer exist, Germany is united, and the Soviet Union is embroiled in massive internal economic and political turmoil. It is not optimistic to proclaim that the Cold War

is over and the western alliance is the victor. But it is important to restrain our euphoria while we assess the new situation and plan for the future.

The end of the Cold War era marks an epoch change in the strategic environment. "For over forty years American strategy and defense spending has focused on the Soviet threat."³ This traditional military strategy was built on deterrence through strength. The threat was so pervasive that for the first time in our peacetime history the United States maintained a standing army outside its borders for a prolonged period. As part of the NATO alliance we based 4 2/3 heavy divisions, 326,000 personnel, and 6 1/3 additional sets of divisional equipment in Europe to counter the Soviet conventional threat. Our conventional capabilities were backed up by theater nuclear forces and ultimately the strategic triad.

Had deterrence failed, the United States was prepared to execute a planned response to honor our commitments to our NATO coalition partners. The forward defense was manifested in a thoroughly developed and rehearsed campaign plan that would be executed by the in country forces and backed up by rapid reinforcement. The full range of nuclear weapons further demonstrated our resolve to defend Europe. In effect the deterrent value of nuclear weaponry was extended to deter conventional aggression.

This Cold War strategy was remarkably consistent and durable for forty five years. The rigid East-West stand off was very predictable. National relationships tended to be either black or white. The alliances were clearly established. Testimony to the enduring, stable relationships that developd after World War II is the fact that the Atlantic Alliance has now outlasted all multinational peacetime alliances in modern history.⁴

The United States' strategy reflected the world situation. Although our strategy was global in scope, it was Eurocentric in emphasis and oriented almost exclusively on containing the communist model of the Soviet Union. Our Cold War era strategy was also reactive. All military forces and other elements of national power from the NATO coalition were designed to counter global war originating from a Soviet thrust into western Europe. Our response to Soviet aggression was to be an automatic reinforcement of our forward deployed forces. Our war plans were designed to defeat the Soviets far forward, ceding as little territory to the Warsaw Pact as possible.

The decline of the Soviet-led Warsaw Pact rendered the strategy of containment obsolete. Our military strategy can no longer remain focused on the Soviet threat because it appears that this threat no longer exists (at least not at its previous strength.) Certainly, the Soviet's capability to launch a massive, no-notice attack into western Europe is a

relic of a bygone era. The possibility of global war with the Soviets can no longer be the dominant threat scenario that is considered in planning.

While there is a great deal of optimism about new U.S.-Soviet relationships, much remains to be resolved. The Soviet threat has not vanished. It is still very much intact. Even after the reductions mandated by the Conventional Forces in Europe (CFE) treaty are implemented, the Soviet Union will still be able to field more than one hundred divisions.⁵ The rhetoric and intentions of the current regime have moderated, but their capabilities are largely unchanged. "The Soviet Union remains the one country in the world with the means to destroy the United States with a single, cataclysmic attack."⁶ As the Cold War fades and the armies in eastern Europe are dismantled, the warning time with respect to possible aggression by the Soviets is increasing. Again, the threat has not disappeared, it is simply less ominous at this particular time. It is not impossible for a resurgence to occur or for new threats to arise. Thus the success of our traditional strategy is not yet complete. Despite the promising changes that have occurred, Europe is not free from the specter of war. In our new strategic thinking we must continue to be cautious and capable of countering the residual Soviet power. It is important that we do not confuse this temporary condition of peace for a permanent state.

Containment of the most virulent forms of communism is a huge strategic success, but it has not resulted in a universally peaceful, stable world environment that is void of threats to the United States. To the contrary the strategic environment that is emerging is fraught with violent uncertainties and ambiguities. The Cold War stand off between the two super powers served to hold the rest of the world in check. For most of the Cold War era the nation-states of the world were more or less controlled or responded to either the United States or the Soviet Union. (A few nations did band together in a loosely formed coalition of non-aligned states.) The world was bipolar. This situation existed through the 1980s when super power domination started to wane. The retrenchment of the Soviet Union in 1989 accelerated this trend to a furious pace.

A Contingency Based Strategy

The decline of the Soviet threat, the emergence of new and changing threats to U.S. interests, and the transformation of global fiscal attitudes have reshaped the security environment. These changes in the environment have caused a redirection in our strategic thought. The revised strategic blue print contains elements of continuity and change. One of the continuing tenets is the premise that the United States

will continue to serve a unique leadership responsibility for preserving peace and security.

The change in the National Military Strategy is summarized as "Reliance on forward deployed forces backed up by CONUS based reinforcements has been replaced by forward presence supported by power projection from a CONUS based central reserve."⁷ In addition to the leadership role of the United States other aspects of previous strategy remain valid today. Deterrence, collective security, maritime and aerospace superiority, security assistance, and arms control continue to form a large part of the new military strategy. However we cannot afford to cling to the obsolete forward deployed policy. We no longer have the need nor the fiscal ability to keep half a million members of the U.S. military deployed on 375 bases around the world. A feasible and realistic solution is to shift to a power projection strategy.

There is a degree of risk involved in shifting to a strategy that is focused on regional contingencies. As discussed earlier the Soviet threat has not disappeared. Because global war remains a concern, the new military strategy must provide for dual capabilities. We must develop and nurture the means to respond to a major regional crisis against a capable foe while preserving our ability to expand for global war.

Reconstitution provides the method to raise large forces and expand the industrial base to protect our interests. The demands of global war would require increased quantities of munitions, weapon systems, and other materials of war to maintain an enlarged force. In response to strategic warning, force generation through the activation of reserve units would provide the majority of the larger force.

A power projection strategy requires reshaping the bulk of the present active component structure into a lean, flexible, combat-ready reserve in the United States. It calls for forces capable of moving anywhere in the world when a regional crisis or impending conflict threatens an ally or American vital interest.

The risk inherent in a reduced force structure can be reduced by configuring a force that maximizes flexibility. Our strategy is no longer based on an automatic response to reinforce forward deployed forces. U.S. actions will be a function of our interests and the threat, assessed as the crisis evolves.

Power projection has been dubbed the "hallmark of the new strategy."⁸ The concept of using a U.S. based strike force as opposed to relying primarily on forward deployed forces is the principal departure from the old strategy. It is also the concept that will drive the modification of our force structure. Contingency operations are a form of power projection but this is not a new mission for the Army or the

rest of the armed forces. In the past however, contingency operations were a lesser adjunct to the massive on going military operation in Europe. Desert Shield/Storm in 1991 was a departure from the forty year old trend of "Europe first." The emphasis on contingency operations is at the base of the new strategy.

The forces that are included in the contingency corps face an enormous challenge. This corps, as part of a joint force, will respond to undefined crises in unknown parts of the world and oppose an unspecified foe. The mission is incredibly demanding and of the greatest importance. Some military analysts argue that the use of force as a policy tool will be more limited or even eliminated in the near future. This theory has been a recurring theme throughout history. In every case the arguments that war has become obsolete, in spite of their logic, have been wrong. The economic element of power is certainly becoming an incredibly powerful tool and may even come to have the greatest long-term utility in pursuing our national interests. The economic power of the United States however is declining in relation to that of other actors that are experiencing tremendous growth. The role of the military will continue to have a major position in the security of the United States. Even in low-intensity conflict scenarios where political and economic agents should dominate policy, the military will be of great importance.

Based on the previous descriptions of the global situation, the rise of new, different, and multiple threats, and new concepts in the military strategy, the force structure and relative importance attached to the various forces will change. The policy of containment of the Soviet military threat in Europe required forces that do not fit a strategy that is characterized by power projection. The ground forces that were forward deployed in Europe and contributed to victory in the Cold War are massive, heavy divisions, armored cavalry regiments, self-propelled artillery battalions and all other supporting arms and services equipped with armored vehicles to fight a massive, high-intensity war in a developed theater. The U.S. forces equipped with seventy ton main battle tanks, sophisticated infantry fighting vehicles, computer-linked field artillery cannons and rockets, and advanced aviation units in conjunction with our NATO allies, were designed to fight a huge conventional battle that was planned in great detail. The heavy division force structure was ideal for deterring or fighting a war against the Soviets in Europe. The battle lines were drawn, battlefield analysis conducted in great detail, and the lead echelon forces in place.

Although there were many scenarios that could have developed if war had occurred in Europe, most of the planning had already been accomplished. The mission analysis, development of courses of action, war gaming and decision

making processes had been accomplished many times over. The equipment and forces that were needed to execute the campaign evolved and were refined over forty years. Based on the equipment and forces of our adversary and the terrain in Europe, heavy, large caliber main battle tanks and equally capable and sophisticated mechanized infantry units were the essential weapons systems for executing the strategy of containment. In order to reduce the overwhelming quantitative advantage held by the Warsaw Pact, the NATO allies, and the United States in particular fielded equipment that was more capable and provided a qualitative advantage. These qualitative advantages were generally high technology components that made the U.S. equipment more accurate, more reliable, more lethal, and more survivable. They also made our equipment heavier, more difficult to transport, and much more expensive.

Given forty years to work on the problem of containing the Soviet threat by deterring war in Europe, a consistent, but continuously fine tuned strategy was developed. The forces, equipment, organizations, training and all other aspects of the equation to support this strategy were analyzed, compiled and positioned. The NATO leadership developed the support system that was required to provide the immense quantities of supplies and equipment to sustain the force. Mobilization plans and deployment exercises were used to ensure that reinforcements would arrive in a timely manner. A command and

control apparatus evolved that included heads of state, secretaries of state and defense, and military commanders from the members of the alliance. In short, the strategy was developed and consistent, and the force structure provided the means to execute the strategy.

A power projection strategy is hamstrung by the very force structure that was successful in the Cold War. The massive, ponderous divisions equipped with heavy, armored vehicles lack the characteristics that are demanded by contingency forces. The need for armor and mechanized divisions has not been eliminated; however, it has been reduced. Lighter, more deployable forces to implement the contingency strategy will become a higher priority. Just as contingency forces were needed in a supporting role during the Cold War which emphasized forward deployed divisions, heavy divisions in their present form will still be needed in a supporting role in an era that emphasizes rapid deployment, mobile forces and strike operations.

The Methodology for Regional Force Planning (MFRFP)

Paragraph one of the MFRFP provides the background data that force planners must have when making force structure decisions. In effect, paragraph one sets the stage for further steps in the process. Each potential contingency operation will require a response that fits the mission,

threat, terrain, and time available (METT-T). The elements of METT-T parallel the components in the first paragraph of the MFRFP. The mission, forces (enemy and friendly), and area determine the type of force that is required. Unfortunately, in the world of contingency operations most of the factors of METT-T/paragraph 1 of the MFRFP are not defined. Unlike the Supreme Allied Commander-Europe (SACEUR) who has detailed Order of Battle (OB) information on multiple echelons of Warsaw Pact forces, or the Commander in Chief Pacific (CINCPAC) who has had the time to thoroughly study the terrain and environment of his area of responsibility, or any other commander who can develop a high degree of focus when writing a mission statement, the contingency corps operates in the murky, mushy world of great unknowns.

Paragraph 2 of the MFRFP identifies the characteristics of a force in terms of personnel, equipment, doctrine, and organization in relation to the functions of training, mobilization, deployment, employment, and sustainment. Interpretation and analysis of the information compiled in paragraph 2 describes the specifications for the contingency corps. A thorough understanding of these characteristics is essential to structuring the contingency corps because the next step in the process is to determine units that possess capabilities that fulfill the specifications.

Mission

The mission of the contingency corps reflects the all-encompassing, yet largely undefined nature of contingency operations. The contingency corps, as part of a joint force, must be prepared to rapidly deploy anywhere in the world to protect U.S. interests, as specified by the National Command Authorities. The contingency corps will be called upon to perform a variety of missions from a show of force to evacuation operations to limited combat in a LIC scenario, to mid-intensity conventional war. The 1991 Joint Military Net Assessment identifies five scenarios that require the commitment of conventional military contingency forces. Each of the scenarios equate roughly to a different mission. The capability to mobilize, deploy, employ, and sustain conventional forces was analyzed in the context of a counterinsurgency, a lesser regional contingency, a major regional contingency, concurrent or sequential regional contingencies, and a crisis in Europe.⁹

The Threat

The sudden release of pressure that had been created by the Cold War has resulted in a multi-polar world in which smaller regional powers are now more able to pursue their own

interests free of the shackles that had bound them for years. In effect there has been a resurgence of conflicts that super power military dominance can not squelch. Thus, the stability that was created by the Cold War has yielded to a greatly destabilized world with the emergence of many new players with pent up energy from years of inactivity. These new centers of power, exercising their own agendas will develop into friends or foes of the United States depending on how they are nurtured. The creation of the multipolar world has also led to the "intensification of intractable conflicts between mortal enemies now fueled by arms of enormous destruction."¹⁰

The influence of regional powers is becoming of great importance to the United States. Southwest Asia, Central and South America, and the Pacific Rim are regions in which many of the interests of the United States are vested. The rise of regional powers as major players in the security environment and the growing prowess of these nations represent new challenges for the U.S. military. The strategic environment is more diverse, more urgent, and potentially more destructive. During the Cold War the developing countries of the world, in comparison to the Soviet Union, were unimportant actors and they were militarily insignificant. Currently, the regional powers are of great importance to our national interests and in some cases they are capable of fielding very advanced, potent military forces. The qualitative and

quantitative advantage we have enjoyed for years over regional actors (except the Soviet Union) is now being challenged by emerging military powers.

The complexities of what President Bush calls the New World Order in conjunction with the role of the United States as a world leader suggest that the United States will not adopt a policy of isolation. The revised strategic blueprint contains elements of continuity and change. The new strategy of the United States will have to account for the vestiges of the Soviet threat, the rise of regional threats, and the continuing fight against drugs and terrorism, while competing with a domestic agenda that requires immediate attention.

"Each year the mechanisms of war are becoming more destructive, more accurate, more numerous, more transportable, and more available."¹¹ Third World countries possess much better than third rate military forces. The enhancement and build up of the militaries in the developing world at the expense of other aspects of economic development has caused staggering burdens in some cases. Sales of the full range of modern military weapons continues unabated. These sales cripple economies while producing armies and air forces that are equipped with close to state-of-the-art military hardware capable of wreaking havoc.

Recent wars have become more deadly than conflicts in earlier eras. The destruction of human lives and property is a function of the steadily increasing lethality of

conventional weapons. The most lethal single conflict in modern times has been civil struggle in Cambodia, where the Pol Pot regime decimated the Cambodian people.¹² The Afghan conflict has exacted massive casualties, laid waste to the nation's countryside and generated millions of refugees. The cumulative effects of advanced conventional weapons can easily approximate those of weapons of mass destruction.

Modern military technology is spreading throughout the globe and high-technology weapons are available to friendly and hostile governments, terrorists, and saboteurs. In the Middle East and Southwest Asia, regions of critical interest to the United States, it is estimated that 22,000 tanks and 43,000 armored fighting vehicles stand ready for combat. Senator John McCain, a leading proponent for limiting weapons proliferation reports that "between 1980 and 1987, 22,000 artillery weapons and MRLs [Multiple Rocket Launchers] were transferred to the developing world. In the same period an estimated 2500 aircraft were supplied to Third World countries."¹³

The trend in arms sales is away from providing older technology, less capable weapons systems to the customer. Today T62 and M60 series tanks are deployed in large numbers around the world. High technology, man portable air defense missiles pose a very real threat to an adversary's aircraft. The numbers of artillery pieces and rocket launchers of all makes with ranges up to forty kilometers in use around the

world the world is staggering. Complex, computer driven command and control systems tie these weapons together in even the most backward countries.

In the last ten years the world has witnessed the mining of the Red Sea approaches to the Suez Canal using late model, multifuzed Soviet mines; freedom fighters in Afghanistan and Nicaragua downing aircraft of all types using heat-seeking, surface to air missiles; and subversives in El Salvador using computer generated encryption systems within their command and control structure.¹⁴

The arms race that is ongoing in much of the world is making many countries capable of fielding significant armies. At the same time this conventional arms race compels a more deadly competition for weapons of mass destruction. Imbalances in military capabilities inevitably spur incentives for the attainment of a balancing weight in the form of weapons of mass destruction.

The proliferation of chemical, biological, and nuclear weapons is a threat to world peace and any military force that may oppose a country that possesses these weapons. The speculative data gathered by various sources clearly demonstrate that weapons of mass destruction are present (or soon will be) in every region of the world.

The Iran-Iraq War has signalled the start of an arms race in both chemical and biological weapons. The war provided the Third World with a case study in how to organize chemical forces, in the kind of chemical agents required, in the need to solve

targeting and weather prediction problems, and in the ways in which conventional weapons systems could be adapted to deliver chemical agents.¹⁵

The Iran-Iraq War has forced many nations, in spite of their moral objections, to produce persistent and nonpersistent agents, some of which are ten times more lethal than mustard gas.

The threat of large scale biological warfare is even more chilling. The lethality of anthrax, cholera, plague, or any of the other toxins used in germ warfare can exceed the lethality of VX nerve agent by more than one hundred times. Another disturbing characteristic of biological weapons is the vast area that can be affected and infected by relatively small quantities of agent.

The nuclear arms race has been underway for years. Countries such as Argentina, Brazil, Chile, Israel, Libya, Iraq, and Iran, and Syria are all in some phase (from low level research to stocking weapons) of attaining a nuclear arsenal. The safeguards to prevent the proliferation of nuclear weapons are much stronger than those that apply to chemical and biological weapons and apparently have caused many nations to slow down their efforts and forced others to keep their nuclear devices hidden. Nuclear acquisition also remains far more costly and difficult than that of chemical and biological weapons. However the risk that national or subnational groups will construct or acquire a nuclear

explosive is very real. The large amount of civilian plutonium that is produced and stockpiled is a probable source for the fissile material that can be upgraded to weapon quality. A relatively small amount of such plutonium is needed for a nuclear explosive. The technical information required to fabricate a nuclear device is available in open literature and only a limited number of competent people are necessary to fabricate a primitive nuclear device.¹⁶ The existence of a nuclear black market has been the subject of debate for years. Admiral Stansfield Turner, former Director of Central Intelligence, believes that such a market is active.¹⁷

The dangers associated with the proliferation of nuclear weapons are staggering. In the wrong hands nuclear weapons can be used for intimidation, terrorist activities, or as a force multiplier on the battlefield. In addition to further destabilizing the already tense world situation, these weapons have a huge impact on the military balance of power. Battlefield use of these weapons poses a tremendous risk to a potential adversary.

The militarization of the multipolar world coupled with a propensity for many actors to use force is an aspect of the emerging world that requires the continued presence of a strong international leader backed by a powerful military. As the Soviets appear to become less of a military threat, others rise to take their place. Many countries can now field armies

that have arsenals of advanced military hardware, occasionally a trained force that is capable of using the weapons, and an international arena that encourages the spread of weapons of mass destruction. There are a number of countries that field late model main battle tanks, fighting vehicles, antitank guided missiles, precision guided munitions, and most of the other weapons of the military superpowers. The spread of these weapons has been underway for years and is not likely to be stymied in the near future. The arms race in the Third World is furious.

The military capabilities of these countries should not be characterized as low intensity. Although our strategy and doctrine that is developed to address the Third World will continue to stress the supporting role of the military, when a military response is required to intervene in a crisis situation, our adversary will not be a push over. The 1991 war in the Persian Gulf provided us with a glimpse of what may be in the future. Although there are very few forces that are as large as the pre-war Iraqi army, there are many distant threats that field the same type of advanced conventional forces and terror weapons. It is conceivable that a nation that possesses advanced weaponry may also have the leadership that would make it deadly. A well led adversary may have learned many lessons about our capabilities and vulnerabilities as an observer of Saddam Hussein's mistakes. It is these potential threats that the contingency corps must be prepared to fight.

The individual military machines that are in place around the world do not replicate the threat of the Warsaw Pact; however, they are a formidable force and in some cases they have the capability to threaten the interests of the United States. Given the advantages of surprise, internal lines of communication (as opposed to our greatly extended supply lines), a reasonably well equipped and trained force, there are many nations that have the potential to wage a military campaign that will require a significant response from the National Command Authorities.

Friendly Forces

The friendly forces available to the commander of the contingency corps and ultimately the joint commander is the central focus of this thesis. The forces that are included in the contingency corps must be able to be deployed to and employed/sustained in any area of the world against a variety of threat forces. The difficulty in meeting the demanding requirements can be mitigated by a force that contains a proper mix of combat units. It is important that the contingency corps contains all of the units that may have to be called upon in crisis situations. The potential for serious degradation in effectiveness resulting from last minute inclusions in a deploying force is a problem that can be avoided. The contingency corps must be trained, equipped,

and exercised for the unique responsibilities as an expeditionary force. The problems of a smooth, expedient departure at the ports of embarkation, execution problems on the battlefield resulting from lack of familiarity with tactical procedures, and a potential interoperability mismatch in the sustainment arena (spare parts, ammunition, maintenance personnel) in the face of a skilled, well-equipped enemy, make it imperative that the contingency corps be a cohesive, well-trained unit that has the benefits of habitual relationships.

There are many units available to be molded into a corps organization that can meet the difficult challenges of responding to short notice deployments into a combat zone. Once the specifications for the force are identified, units can be selected that satisfy the criteria. No single unit or type of unit is capable of meeting all of the requirements. Many different types of units will be combined to fulfill the overall mission. A review of the capabilities and limitations of the of combat units in the Army is essential to an effort to attempt to fit these units to the criteria required by the contingency corps.

Heavy Divisions

The heavy divisions of the U.S. Army--armored and mechanized infantry--provide mobile, armor-protected firepower. Because of their mobility, survivability, and firepower, heavy divisions are normally deployed where battles are fought over wide areas against a threat with similar capabilities. Heavy divisions operate best in open terrain where they can move quickly and can use their long-range, direct fire weapons to their best advantage. Heavy divisions are particularly well equipped to operate on a conventional, chemical, or nuclear battlefield.

In a rapid deployment role, heavy divisions are seriously limited by substantial quantities of heavy equipment that requires huge amounts of strategic airlift assets. The tracked vehicles and heavy equipment of mechanized and armored divisions require an immense logistics infrastructure to provide continuous support. Additionally, operational movements that cover large distances require railroad and/or large amounts of scarce highway transport vehicles. Heavy divisions are not designed to operate in jungles, dense forests, or mountains.¹⁸

Light Infantry Divisions

Light infantry divisions (LID) are the most rapidly and strategic deployable of the various U.S. divisions. According to FM 101-10-1, light infantry divisions are organized for rapid employment worldwide with credible forces to stabilize a situation, to act as a show of force, or to secure a base to expand further operations. LIDs are best employed to defeat light infantry forces in a low- to mid-intensity conflict on restricted terrain, in limited visibility. LIDs fight as part of a larger force in conventional conflicts or indepently in low-intensity scenarios. Light divisions are capable of conducting military operations on urban terrain and can perform air assault operations when augmented with aviation assets.

The light infantry divison is not designed to conduct forced entry operations. Additionally, in order to achieve a high degree of strategic deployability, light divisions sacrifice many aspects of combat power. Light divisions have limited tactical mobility, few anti-armor weapons, limited protection from conventional fires, do not function well in an NBC environment, and operate without redundant systems.¹⁹

Airborne Division

The airborne division is the Army's only conventional unit that is capable of conducting forced entry operations. This unit is ideally suited to be rapidly deployed to seize airfields or other critical facilities, secure terrain, or interdict supply routes. The airborne division can conduct airborne assaults as a show of force or to reinforce forces already deployed. Once inserted into an area of operations the airborne division conducts missions normally assigned to infantry units such as air assault operations. In unusual circumstances airborne units may participate in rescue operations and large scale tactical raids.

The airborne division must rely on U.S. Air Force strategic airlift for initial entry and resupply. Although weather considerations may have little impact on navigation to designated drop zones, conducting an airborne insertion in adverse weather will impede rapid assembly and ability to immediately conduct combat operations. Once delivered onto the battlefield the airborne division has limited ground and air mobility. The airborne division is also limited by a lack of firepower--artillery, air defense, and anti tank.²⁰

Air Assault Division

The air assault division combines strategic mobility with a high degree of tactical mobility, and in conjunction with its attack aviation assets, a significant amount of firepower. The air assault division is organized around a light infantry base organization that does not include a significant amount of heavy equipment except for its organic helicopter battalions. Thus the air assault division is essentially a middleweight organization that combines features of light divisions with some of the combat power of heavier units. The air assault division conducts combat operations with infantry, aviation, and the necessary combat support and service support to strike over extended distances and terrain obstacles to attack the enemy. Once deployed on the ground, air assault task forces fight like the battalions of a standard infantry division; however, the use of organic aviation assets permits rapid aerial redeployment. The essence of air assault tactics is rapid tempo of operations over extended ranges.

Air assault units are restricted by severe weather conditions that make helicopter flight impossible. Without helicopters for mobility the division is reduced to movement by foot. The air assault division is plagued by a lack of ground based anti tank weapons but not nearly to the degree of

the light infantry division. An enemy with a well developed low- to mid-altitude air defense network will limit the effectiveness of movement by helicopter.²¹

Armored Cavalry Regiments

The armored cavalry regiment (ACR) is a self-contained combined arms team equipped with heavy armored vehicles. The regiment is organized with a three armored cavalry squadrons, a combat aviation squadron, a field artillery battalion, an air defense battery, and engineer, military intelligence, and chemical companies. The ACR also includes an organic support squadron to accomplish the sustainment functions. The ACR is a robust, heavy organization capable of conducting combat operations on a high density battlefield.

The ACR is usually assigned to a heavy corps headquarters. The regiment's basic tasks are reconnaissance and security. These tasks are accomplished through combined arms action at all levels from scout squad through the regiment. The regiment usually controls subordinate combat and combat support units through centralized planning and decentralized execution. An armored cavalry squadron can be augmented with engineer, air defense artillery and other supporting arms to fight independently for limited periods of time.

The ACR operates over wide fronts and to extended depths to collect conduct reconnaissance and report intelligence information. The weapon systems of the ACR allow it to engage and destroy threat armored vehicles at extended ranges in either offensive or defensive operations. The ACR has a significant NBC capability and is well suited to conduct monitoring and survey. The combat aviation squadron can conduct armed aerial escort for air assault operations.

The ACR with its heavy equipment and complete complement of supporting arms is a large organization that requires a significant amount of strategic lift in order to deploy. M1A1 tanks weigh in excess of 70 tons and each tank requires a C5 sortie to be deployed. Although the ACR can be task organized and tailored to suit deployment and employment requirements, operating over extended distances may allow squadrons, troops, or platoons to become isolated and then neutralized.²²

Motorized Regiment

The motorized units in the Army's force structure are being drastically reduced; however, a separate motorized regiment will continue to exist. Motorized units are organized to be highly flexible and strategically deployable in a variety of situations across the operational continuum. The motorized regiment is equipped and trained for combat in desert and mountainous regions and it retains the utility to

respond to missions in Europe and the flexibility to provide increased firepower and mobility to light units in a low-intensity conflict.

The motorized regiment is specifically organized to be rapidly deployable and immediately capable of performing combat operations upon arrival in any environment. In order to fight against an enemy armored threat the division is organized around combined arms battalions equipped with a substantial number of long-range anti-armor weapons. These weapons are maneuvered quickly by using the organic HMMWV that are the prime mover within the regiment. Motorized units are capable of operating in an NBC environment.

Motorized organizations are limited by the small degree of survivability that is inherent to unarmored wheeled vehicles. Units that are equipped primarily with wire-guided missiles may also lack the capacity to conduct offensive operations against an enemy in modern tanks.²³

Heavy Separate Brigades

Separate brigades are organized for and capable of conducting sustained operations under corps control or while attached to a division. A heavy separate brigade has a fixed organization that includes combat support and service support units. Separate brigades have the same capabilities and limitations of heavy divisions but are more deployable because they are only 1/3 the size.²⁴

Area

The contingency corps has a global mission. Because potential threats can emerge from any region, the contingency corps must be prepared to fight anywhere in the world. Several locations are considered to be "hot spots" because of the presence of long-standing antagonists or general instability. The Korean peninsula and Southwest Asia fall into these respective categories. Lesser regional conflicts and counterinsurgencies have the potential to develop anywhere. The MFRFP is usually applied to a specific region or country as an enabling step to developing a viable force structure for that particular region. The vastly different regions of the world that may be the locations of future battlefields complicate the force structure problem immensely. The force that responds to a situation on the Arabian Peninsula will be vastly different from the force that is suited to operate in El Salvador. The possibility for conflict exists on every continent and in areas as diverse as jungles, mountains, deserts, the plains of Europe, and large urban areas. The realities of geography in terms of distances from the United States also impact on contingency operations. Deployment to Southwest Asia covers 7000 nautical miles. Korea is a 6000 nautical mile journey from the United States and Europe is separated from North America by 4500 nautical

miles. The diversity in the areas of possible employment and extreme distances involved require that a wide array of forces be included in the contingency corps so this unit can respond across a spectrum of situations.

Equipment

The contingency corps, to fight successfully in the environment previously described, must be equipped with weapon systems for combat in the mid-intensity, conventional war range. Although many scenarios may be characterized politically as low-intensity, the potential enemy forces will be capable of waging combat as described in the center of the operational continuum--not just at the low end. It is mid-intensity scenarios that should drive the equipment needs of all forces and battlefield operating systems in the contingency corps. True low-intensity conflict requires a force equipped specifically for that environment; however the equipment needs are not mutually exclusive. Equipping a force for mid-intensity conflict will address many, but not all, of the needs for a force deploying to a low-intensity scenario.

One of the most important criteria for the contingency corps is that it be equipped so that it has the capability to defeat opposing combined arms and heavy forces. Recent combat experiences have continued to demonstrate that tanks are extremely effective killers of enemy tanks and other armored

vehicles. The hyper-velocity, kinetic energy round fired by tank main guns is the surest way to defeat enemy armor. The Army currently fields only one variety or type of tank. The main battle tank (MBT) is an awesome weapon but presents some severe problems with deployability.

Anti-tank guided missiles (ATGM) are a more deployable but less capable alternative. ATGM systems lack the lethality and survivability of main battle tanks but the family of missile systems offers the advantage of being man portable or mounted on vehicles that are much more deployable than main battle tanks.

Infantry fighting vehicles, the weapon system that complements tanks in the heavy force is another alternative that defeats enemy armor. The M2 Bradley Infantry Fighting Vehicle is a major advancement in infantry systems. Infantry fighting vehicles, armed with an array of potent weapons, are able to destroy all armored vehicles except for the latest, top-of-the-line main battle tanks produced by the Soviet Union.

Attack helicopters are also particularly effective tank killers. Armed with ATGMs and gun systems, attack helicopter units offer a great amount of mobility and firepower.

A second benchmark is a force equipped to operate on a battlefield where nuclear, biological, or chemical weapons are likely to be employed. Given the proliferation of NBC weapons and the equalizing effect that may be obtained from their use,

it is prudent for U.S. forces to be able to protect themselves, continue their mission, and possibly retaliate in kind. Contingency units should be equipped with the full range of NBC defensive measures and possess a limited capability for offensive action. A unit that is not equipped to function on an integrated battlefield is a liability. Protection from the effects of NBC weapons can be achieved by many techniques and equipment.

The preponderance of the forces that are included in the contingency corps must be equipped in such a manner that rapid deployment is not sacrificed. Therefore large quantities of MBTs, IFVs, heavy engineer vehicles, and other heavy equipment will be ruled out because of the disproportionate amount of airlift required to move units that are organized around heavy, armored equipment. A heavy component is called for, but the preponderance of the contingency corps will be forced to compromise combat power to achieve deployability. The key is to trade away the smallest amount of combat power while maintaining the ability to deploy quickly.

Rapid deployment to contingency theaters is achieved through airlift. Strategic sealift is not appropriate for contingency operations because of the long deployment times inherent in moving by ship. Reinforcing forces that are predominantly heavy units will begin the deployment process by sealift. The key to strategic mobility is the ability to move the equipment that is required by a force on a small number of

C141 aircraft. Outsized equipment that must be moved by C5 aircraft is often the limiting factor when determining deployability. Armored vehicles and heavy equipment quickly exceeds the weight specifications for safe operation of the aircraft. Only one M1 tank can be moved on a C5 sortie.

A potential work-around for the combat power versus deployability dilemma is the use of advanced technology combat multipliers. High tech systems such as precision guided munitions, night vision devices, and space systems like JSTARS enhance the capabilities of combat units at a small price in terms of deployability.

Personnel

Contingency operations will place a premium on the flexibility and creativity of the individual fighter. Virtually all combat specialties are required for the combat units in the contingency corps. Infantrymen (light, heavy, airborne, air assault), armor crewmen, field artillerists, air crews, air defenders, engineers and many others must contribute their individual talents to the organization. Warriors assigned to the expeditionary force will be drawn from the high quality pool of Army recruits and molded into effective units through the focused training program executed by the contingency corps.

Doctrine

As identified in Chapter 2, the published doctrine that applies specifically to contingency operations is not overwhelming in scope. Doctrine has not caught up to the changes in the environment and emerging military strategy. The draft versions of AirLand Battle-Future are steeped in concepts that apply to contingency operations and the possibilities of short-notice deployments to conduct combat operations in the center of the operational continuum.²⁵ When the next generation of doctrine is published the doctrine gap will be eliminated.

Recognizing that contingency operations will always include services other than the Army, joint doctrine will govern the issues where different services interface. Joint doctrine will be important not only on the battlefield, but also during deployment when airlift (and in some cases sealift) assets are used. If the contingency corps headquarters is designated as the JTF headquarters, the joint interface is even more essential.

On the battlefield, Army elements will conduct operations in accordance with the constructs of AirLand Battle. Although this doctrine requires modifications to be used effectively in low-intensity environments, its emphasis on flexibility and non-linear battlefields makes it viable for use in most contingency operations. As the planning focus shifts away

from the European theater to power projection scenarios, doctrine will emerge that is even better suited for this form of warfare.

Organization

The contingency corps organization will resemble that of a standard U.S. corps. The corps staff will be virtually identical to other U.S. army corps with the exception that it should be capable of functioning as a Joint Task Force headquarters. The most conspicuous characteristic of the contingency corps will be the extremely diverse subordinate units that are attached to it. The contingency corps, in order to accomplish its all-encompassing mission, must combine combat units from across the Army that have little in common except for their focus on contingency operations. The French have structured their rapid deployment forces in this manner and tested the concept repeatedly.²⁶ The leadership challenge in molding a disparate collection of military units into an effective fighting organization will be significant.

A second characteristic of the contingency corps organization is the need to develop and use unusual task organizations. Because of the requirement to deploy rapidly, and the diverse geographic locations and threat forces, a "package" will be tailored to meet the METT-T factors of each situation. Leaders will attempt to maintain unit integrity

when developing these packages but there will probably be instances that call for units organized in other than their traditional task organizations. An air assault task force may be under the operational control of a heavy division that is augmented by a light infantry brigade if a situation requires such a force structure.

The traditional concepts of task organization may have to be violated in order to deploy a force that fits each unique contingency. Generally, units are not as effective when they operate outside of comfortable relationship with a headquarters they are habitually assigned to. Ad hoc organizations that do not train as a unit are destined to experience problems on the battlefield. The training regimen of the contingency corps must stress complementary operations (light-heavy, heavy-light, etc) and departures from traditional task organizations so that a comfortable relationship with a degree of interoperability between units is developed. As much as possible the potential relationships should be identified in the planning process and exercised in advance to produce an integrated, effective organization.

Deployment

In any scenario, speed will be of the essence in contingency operations. Loss of life, property, or vital materials will most likely be reduced based on how quickly a force can be introduced into a crisis area.

The ability to deploy rapidly is arguably the most important characteristic for contingency forces. Rapid deployment is accomplished through unit movement on U.S. Air Force strategic lift aircraft. The Air Force maintains a fleet of 109 C5 Galaxy aircraft and 234 C141 Starlifters.²⁷ Because C5 and C141 aircraft are scarce resources, the Army contingency corps must be chosen to minimize the demand placed on airlift assets. Army units that require the smallest number of C141/C5 sorties are "light" units but all units are capable of moving by air. Light units are suited to deploy rapidly because they are not equipped with large weapon systems or other items of heavy equipment. Although the lack of heavy equipment makes some units easy to move by air, it presents problems in the employment phase.

DEPLOYMENT DATA²⁸

TYPE UNIT	C5 SORTIES &	C141 SORTIES
LIGHT INFANTRY DIVISION	8	615
AIRBORNE DIVISION	17	848
AIR ASSAULT DIVISION	36	1061
HEAVY DIVISION	537	1198
ARMORED CAV REGIMENT	262	190
MOTORIZED REGIMENT	27	501
HEAVY SEPARATE BDE	273	243

Units in the contingency corps that are equipped and organized for rapid deployment must focus on strategic deployment as a mission essential task. The ability to move a large unit to a port of embarkation, proceed expeditiously through the loading process, and complete a complicated deployment requires training, detailed staff planning, and leadership positioned at critical locations during the entire deployment process.

Deployment of the contingency force will be the first battle in a situation that requires power projection. The corps must be equipped with weapon systems that are capable of being deployed in large numbers on small numbers of aircraft, and manned by trained personnel who can exploit the advantages of deployment by the cargo aircraft of the U.S. Air Force.

Employment

The ability to deploy rapidly, although of great importance, is only one criteria that must be considered when designing the corps. The force that deploys must be capable of accomplishing its assigned mission. In some cases the mission will dictate that combat with a capable adversary is inevitable. Protecting the interests of the United States is becoming more difficult as potential threat armies become more capable. In circumstances such as lesser regional contingencies, the contingency force will be able to defeat

the enemy or otherwise restore stability as a Joint Task Force that operates under the command and control of a regional CINC. In other circumstances the contingency force, in spite of the efforts of force planners, will not be able single-handedly to accomplish the mission. Reinforcing units will be needed to build-up a sufficient quantity of combat power that will eventually be capable of defeating the enemy. While this build-up occurs, the contingency force will be tasked with establishing and maintaining the lodgement that allows follow-on forces unimpeded movement into the theater. As potential threat forces continue to enhance their combat capabilities, the possibility increases that a U.S. force that is projected to a distant battlefield with a minimal amount of preparation time will be at considerable risk. It is conceivable that in the future the contingency force could be at a significant disadvantage until it is fully deployed with the maximum combat power available and is fully operational.

The contingency force needs to be a staunch military unit. Light forces that can get to the battlefield quickly, but do not possess the power necessary to engage in combat with a capable enemy will not be able to adequately protect our interests and may experience heavy casualties. It is critical that the forces that are deployed quickly, are also capable of conducting intense combat operations upon their arrival. After observing the war in the Persian Gulf, our adversaries will certainly understand that their greatest

chance for victory is in the initial stages of our response before we have massed the forces that make the United States a military superpower.

Commanders must consider mission, area, enemy, and time factors when making decisions about the contingency forces that will be effective in a given situation. These decisions are especially difficult in counterinsurgency scenarios where massive amounts of combat power and large military formations are not the proper tools. Many detailed studies have addressed the role of the military at the lowest end of the operational continuum. Generally, the units that are best suited to operate in the insurgency/counterinsurgency environment should be drawn from the pool of special operations forces. In situations in the middle of the operational continuum (regional contingencies thru conventional war) where the commander endeavors to maximize traditional combat power in a very short period of time he will have to make compromises involving speed of delivering units and relative combat power. Combat power is quantified in the following table.

RELATIVE COMBAT POWER

TYPE UNIT	COMBAT POWER
LIGHT INFANTRY DIVISION	421
AIRBORNE DIVISION	780
AIR ASSAULT DIVISION	815
HEAVY DIVISION	1227
ARMORED CAV REGIMENT	459
MOTORIZED REGIMENT	307
HEAVY SEPARATE BDE	440

Quantifying combat power is a difficult process that may produce questionable results because many aspects of combat are simply not quantifiable. The method used for this study is currently used by force developers and computes a numerical value based entirely on quantity of equipment and personnel. The values above reflect main battle tank equivalents for each unit. By using a common factor to compare friendly units it is possible to draw conclusions about their relative capabilities.

Sustainment

Of untold importance are the sustaining forces that provide service support to the contingency corps. The service support units will be as responsible, if not more, for the success of any contingency operation. The magnitude of the logistics tail for a deployed force is staggering. The austere nature of the potential locations for employment only makes the service support function more critical and more difficult. The units involved in sustaining an expeditionary force will vary from water purification units, to medical holding companies, to petroleum pipeline battalions to grave registration personnel. These combat service support units and personnel will perform their duties at locations scattered from the ports of debarkation to the forward edge of the battle area. The scope of the supplies and services needed is immense.

Understandably, designing the force structure of the Corps Support Command (COSCOM) is a complicated undertaking. The restrictions and qualifiers that dictate the nature of the combat forces that are structured into the corps also apply to the service support units. The requirement for rapid deployment is extremely difficult for units that must move trailers, massive amounts of spare parts, and outsized equipment. The logistics infrastructure required to support a force is an important factor in the total contingency corps.

Mobilization

Mobilization of Army reserve component forces (to include round out units) is not practicable for no-notice or short-notice contingencies. The absolute necessity to deploy fully trained and thoroughly exercised combat units with little warning time is not possible for units that require any level of mobilization. Combat support and combat service support units that are located predominantly in the reserve components are likely to be included in the COSCOM or some other aspect of the contingency corps. In the cases of a major regional contingency or war in Europe, some level of mobilization will occur that will involve reserve combat units and individual replacements that will be assigned to early deploying active duty units.

Training

The quality and intensity of the training of the contingency corps, as for any other military unit, will determine its success or failure on the battlefield. There is no known substitute for properly focused, well planned, and vigorously executed training. It goes without saying that at the unit level, proficiency at collective and individual tasks is an absolute imperative. Without competent soldiers and

capable small units, the contingency corps is a hollow organization.

The focus of the training regimen for the contingency corps should be on rapid deployment of a mix of forces into simulated situations that are likely to occur in the new strategic environment. Forced entry into an area and expansion of the airhead to accomodate follow-on forces is a task that may be common to many contingencies and requires constant training. The training program that is developed should stress the expeditionary or "come as you are" nature of contingency operations. To achieve the maximum benefit and the highest degree of readiness the units of the contingency corps will actually have to alert, assemble, and deploy to distant locations to conduct joint and combined exercises. It is only with experience gained through repetitious training that U.S. power projection can be refined to the point that our forces are capable of executing the strategy.

The calendar must continue to stress training at the combat training centers. The National Training Center, Joint Readiness Training Center, and Combat Maneuver Training Center represent the zenith of training in the U.S. Army. The opposing forces, scenarios, and trainers can be reprogrammed to portray contingency type situations to provide a training experience and feedback that assures success. All exercises should emphasize complementary force operations because that is how the contingency corps is likely to be employed.

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
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CHAPTER 5

A Solution



This proposed contingency corps organization is constituted from existing units with current equipment. It is an amalgamation of combat units from within the force structure. Each of these individual organizations contributes to the capabilities of the contingency corps. Each unit also has limitations that are mitigated by the capabilities of an adjacent unit. The synergy achieved through thorough extensive training of the proper mix of units will ensure success.

The proposed contingency corps is comprised primarily of infantry units. Two of the infantry divisions-the LID and the airborne -maximize the capability to deploy rapidly on strategic airlift assets. Both the LID and airborne division are specifically designed to respond to force projection requirements. The airborne division, with its unique ability to conduct airborne assaults and long history of immediate response to worldwide crises, is of critical importance to the contingency corps.

Both the LID and airborne division lack mobility and substantial firepower once delivered into an area of operations. Middleweight forces, those with substantially more firepower and mobility, but still lacking a high degree of protection, are more difficult to deploy in terms of numbers of airlift sorties. The middleweights can complement and augment the light and airborne divisions and make a deployed force much more potent through their presence and proper utilization on the battlefield.

Although its classification as a middleweight is not of great importance, the characteristics of the air assault division make it suitable as an expeditionary force. The air assault division's infantry battalions are similar to those of LIDs and airborne divisions until deliberately task organized with other combat, combat support, and combat service support units and fused with aviation assets to form an air assault task force. The organic Army aviation assets of the air

assault division are a major component of the combat power of this division. The assault aviation battalions equipped with the UH 60 provide the tactical mobility of the division's personnel, equipment and supplies. This increased mobility allows an air assault unit to operate at a rapid tempo over extended ranges. The organizations and equipment in the air assault division are developed and designed to meet air mobility criteria just as airborne organizations and equipment are required to be air droppable. The attack aviation battalions equipped with advanced attack helicopters (AH 64) are integral members of the combined arms team. Attack helicopters use fire and maneuver to destroy enemy armor and mechanized forces and work extensively with assault aviation units when conducting air assault operations. The air assault division provides the operational foundation, experience, and tactics for air assault operations.

The helicopter units provide the increased firepower and mobility that characterizes the air assault division. The aviation units also require significant airlift assets to deploy from the CONUS base to the area of operations and therefore decrease the deployability of the division. The decrease in strategic mobility is offset by the capabilities of the air assault division. The limitations imposed on helicopter operations by adverse weather can be overcome by including a second middleweight force in the contingency corps.

The motorized regiment is a ground-based middleweight force. It lacks the firepower and survivability that are common to mechanized and armored forces, but it has significantly enhanced mobility and a greater number of anti tank weapons than light and airborne divisions. As a ground-based force the effects of weather will not have a major impact on the ability of this unit to perform its mission.

A motorized regiment equipped with the high mobility, multi-purpose wheeled vehicle (HMMWV) as its prime mover is a model of efficiency in the mobility arena-strategic, operational, and tactical. A motorized regiment can be deployed in a relatively small number of airlift sorties. At the operational level the reliable wheeled vehicles of the motorized regiment allow it to move long distances without incurring the maintenance problems associated with heavy forces and without the need for augmentation required by light divisions that are not 100% mobile. As for tactical mobility, the HMMWV has proven remarkably effective, providing the middleweight force with tactical mobility essentially equal to heavy forces on virtually all terrain.¹

The firepower of motorized units is achieved through the employment of the tube-launched, optically-tracked, wire-guided missile (TOW). In the hands of a well trained crew this missile system is remarkably accurate, but it suffers from a slow rate of fire, the requirement for the

gunner to track the target throughout the duration of the flight of the missile, and questionable effectiveness of the warhead against the most modern armor. The motorized regiment lacks protection and firepower in terms of air defense assets and reliability on only towed artillery.

Survivability of motorized forces is a critical issue. The relatively small number of strategic airlift sorties required to deploy a motorized unit is an indication that the vehicles are not heavily armored. The ability to be protected from enemy artillery and small arms fire must be overcome by means other than large amounts of advanced armor. Although General Meyer, former Chief of Staff of the Army, believed that "rapid mobility, clever tactics, and sophisticated C3I can compensate in considerable degree for lack of armored protection in many scenarios,"² it is indisputable that combat units in thin-skinned vehicles are at risk.

The current motorized regiment as a middleweight force is an excellent unit for use in contingency operations. This unit offers reasonable compromises in terms of strategic mobility and potential tactical combat power. Future upgrades to weapon systems will make the force even more viable.

The armored cavalry regiment is included in the contingency corps for employment in the instances where intense combat with an armored threat is inevitable. The ACR is a heavy, but incredibly powerful organization. The main battle tanks, infantry fighting vehicles, self-propelled

artillery, and other components of a heavy force are formidable, combat-proven weapon systems. The tank-mech combination is a lethal team in any scenario.

Obviously consideration must be given to the question of deployability versus combat capability. The ACR is a large, robust, heavy organization. Main battle tanks and infantry fighting vehicles are designed to provide awesome fire power and protection to the crew. Strategic mobility was not an important criteria when these weapons were designed. The ACR however is an organization that can overcome some of the problems inherent in deploying a sustainable heavy force while still providing a quantum increase in combat power. When viewed as an entity, the ACR is huge-perhaps too heavy to be considered for rapid deployment. When considered as a unit organized so that it can be echeloned or tailored for deployment in accordance with the situation, the ACR begins to look more compatible with contingency operations. Because of its unique organization and history of conducting independent operations, the ACR retains more of its effectiveness when deployed by echelon than other heavy combat units. LTC A.J. Bacevich, a former squadron commander in an armored cavalry regiment, has identified an excellent plan for the echeloned deployment of an ACR during a contingency operation.³

The critical aspect is that the ACR be included in the standing contingency corps organization so that it benefits from the training and cohesion from an established

relationship with the corps staff and other units that will fight on the same battlefield. While it may be unusual that the entire regiment is ever deployed, there are many situations that will call for heavy forces, their command and control apparatus, and CSS infrastructure for use by a commander in a contingency operation.

The contingency corps organized with one light infantry division, one airborne infantry division, an air assault division, a motorized regiment, and an armored cavalry regiment is a unique, diverse organization. The structure for this proposed contingency corps was generated by a methodical evaluation of the factors. Initially, a planner must understand the military strategy that is the basis for all operational and force structure issues. The center piece of the military strategy for the 1990s and beyond is power projection. The forces that are suitable to play the central role in a power projection strategy are different than the forces that dominated a forward deployed strategy.

Understanding the strategic concepts is essential to designing any force. The next step is to discern the mission of the contingency corps and evaluate the area and forces (both enemy and friendly) that shape the environment. This step allows the planner to identify any special requirements that exist. The contingency environment does not lend itself to a lock-step, rudimentary analysis. For the purposes of this study it is not possible to evaluate every potential

crisis situation. The contingency corps staff will embark on such detailed analysis in its deliberated planning process based on identified, specific scenarios, regions and players. The background information that is developed concerning the setting for contingency operations is generally vague, but as such is indicative of the contingency environment. Nonetheless, the information collected on mission, forces, and area allow the planner to determine the requirements for the force structure.

A tool that is designed specifically for analyzing the macro requirements for a force is paragraph 2 of the Methodology for Regional Force Planning. This tool assists the planner by categorizing data concerning the personnel, equipment, doctrine, and organizations required during specific phases (employment, sustainment, deployment, training, and mobilization) of commitment of military forces.

The analysis conducted leads to the contingency corps organization shown and described above. This corps organization meets the specifications developed by applying the model and has adequate and proper forces to accomplish its mission. It is a feasible organization and falls within the guidelines established for Army organizations.

Is it realistic?

The United States Army is projected to be reduced from 18 to 12 active duty divisions between 1991 and 1995. The forces apportioned to the contingency corps must reflect a realistic appraisal of the overall strategy and the role of competing demands for the scarce resources (personnel, equipment, and organizations) in the Army. The contingency corps cannot dominate the force structure to the point that other roles and missions are neglected. Although the contingency corps must have a definite, well-defined focus on its primary mission, it must not be considered a single-role unit. The Army simply cannot afford the luxury of a corps that performs only one mission. In addition to its role in crises, the contingency corps will continue to fit into the war plans developed by regional CINCs.

Balancing the conflicting demands of a military strategy that stresses power projection with a reduced force structure must be addressed by a contingency corps organization that is characterized by its flexibility. The commitment of 3 2/3 divisions to be focused primarily on contingency operations is a necessity. Contingency forces will play the central role in the execution of our military strategy. In effect, contingency forces become the most important tool in the force structure.

Structuring the contingency corps is a difficult process that is further complicated by significant constraints on the current force structure. In this era of changing strategic concepts, declining defense budgets and reduced forces, it is critical that any force be evaluated in terms of its contribution to the overarching strategic plan. For the first time since 1945 the basic strategic plan is undergoing massive revisions. Simultaneously, domestic budget concerns dictate major cuts in military spending. The United States has undertaken large force reductions at various points in its history; however, sweeping changes in the 1990s make the problem more difficult than simply cutting the force. In a speech he made to the Aspen Institute, President Bush recognized the force structure challenge of the immediate future.

The United States would be ill-served by forces that represent nothing more than a scaled-back or shrunken-down version of the ones we possess at present. If we simply prorate our reductions, cut equally across the board, we could easily end up with more than we need for contingencies that are no longer likely and less than we must have to meet emerging challenges. What we need are not merely reductions, but restructuring.⁴

In the same speech the President spoke specifically and at length about "come-as-you-are conflicts" and the need for forces with global reach. The President sees power projection as one of the emerging challenges and a corresponding need for the forces to accomplish the mission.

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